Provisional and Protective Remedies:The British Experience of the Brussels Convention by Maher, G & Rodger, Barry J.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provisional and Protective Remedies
Citation for published version:
Maher, G & Rodger, BJ 1999, 'Provisional and Protective Remedies: The British Experience of the Brussels
Convention' International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48, pp. 302-39. DOI:
10.1017/S0020589300063211
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S0020589300063211
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Publisher Rights Statement:
©Maher, G., & Rodger, B. J. (1999). Provisional and Protective Remedies: The British Experience of the
Brussels Convention. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48, 302-39doi:
10.1017/S0020589300063211
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
PROVISIONAL AND PROTECTIVE REMEDIES: THE BRITISH
EXPERIENCE OF THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION
GERRY MAHER and BARRY J. RODGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT is a well-known facet of litigation that the first step is often more
important than any to follow. Virtually all legal systems bestow on
litigants a variety of interim and provisional remedies. These remedies
have a number of different functions and rationales but two in particular
are thought to be fundamental.1 First, protective remedies provide a
litigant with a degree of protection by ensuring that the status quo is
preserved while the litigation is proceeding; second, these remedies
secure the position of a litigant not only during the course of an action but
also once it is over and he has judgment in his favour. This second function
is usually achieved, in one way or another, by tying up and freezing the
property of the other party to the action.2 However, protective remedies
also serve other functions. Some remedies exist to promote the interest of
a party in the advancement of his case (e.g. orders for disclosure of
evidence), whereas others provide a litigant with part of the overall final
remedy or judgment that he is seeking to gain from the action (e.g. interim
payment or interim damages).
Moreover, there is a further level of interest in provisional and
protective remedies. This lies not so much in their direct function but in
their use as part of the strategy of litigation. Many court actions do not
proceed beyond the initial stages, resulting in settlement between the
parties, or abandonment by one of them. Often not only the terms but
also the very fact of settlement or outcome is a reflection of the
provisional remedies obtained at the earliest stages of the action.3
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1. LawTence Collins, Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (1994),
pp.10-15.
2. It must not be thought that protective remedies are measures available only to parties
who raise actions. For example, in many legal systems the defendant may apply for an order
whereby the plaintiff has to take steps to ensure payment of costs in the event of his losing
the action. In principle there is nothing to prevent a defendant to an action seeking a
provisional or protective measure under ArU24 of the Brussels Convention.
3. A. Zuckerman, "Interlocutory Remedies in Quest of Procedural Fairness" (1993) 56
M.L.R. 325.
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Accordingly, protective and provisional remedies have a crucial role to
play in the strategy of litigation.
All these features of provisional and protective remedies apply with
even greater force where the litigation is international in nature. The fact
that one party may have a weak link with the country of the forum, or at
least a weaker link than that of the other party, tends to increase the
pressure to settle or quit, and in international litigation the place of
provisional remedies may well be even more significant than their
undoubted role in court actions between parties resident in the country of
the court.
The aim of this article is to consider one particular aspect of
international litigation. This is the operation of Article 24 of the 1968
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments.
Article 24 accords jurisdiction to courts in contracting States to grant
provisional and protective remedies even although the courts of another
contracting State have jurisdiction over the substance of the action.
Article 24 of the 1988 Lugano Convention is in identical terms.
Accordingly, the range of these provisions is extremely wide and applies
to all actions within the scope of the two Conventions throughout the
whole European judicial area. In this article we examine various issues
concerning Article 24 of the Brussels Convention. This examination is
timely for several reasons, not least that the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions are currently under a process of detailed review, and the
topic of provisional and protective measures has already been identified
as a key issue in that process.4 Furthermore, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law has included the topic of a worldwide
judgments convention as part of its forthcoming programme of work and
the issue of protective remedies will form part of the discussion on that
convention.5 In addition, there has been a recent judgment by the
European Court of Justice, on a reference from the Hoge Raad in The
Hague, which has dealt directly with some but not all of the core issues of
Article 24 in relation to certain forms of Dutch interim measures.6
This article is in three main parts. First, there is an analysis of the terms
of Article 24 along with a discussion of a range of issues and problems
4. See e.g. Operation of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions (Consultation Paper
issued by the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Scottish Courts Administration, Apr.
1997), esp. pp32-35; Towards Greater Efficiency in Obtaining and Enforcing Judgments in
the European Union (Commission Communication to the Council and the European
Parliament, 26 Nov. 1997), esp. pp.13-15. For a useful discussion see P. R. Beaumont, "A
United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention" (1998) 24
Brooklyn J. Int. L. 75.
5. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document No.7 of
April 1997, para. 126; Preliminary Document No.8 of November 1997, paras.62-64;
Preliminary Document No.9 of July 1998, para. 115. For discussion see Beaumont, ibid
6. In Case C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV v. Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma
Deco-Lmc, Peter Determann KG, judgment of the ECJ, 17 Nov. 1998.
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which commentators have identified as arising from its provisions. In Part
HI we shall consider the guidance given on the solution of these problems
in the official reports on the Convention and in the decisions of the
European Court of Justice. Part IV will consider the legislative and
judicial approaches taken in England and Wales and in Scotland towards
the general implementation of Article 24 and to its interpretation and
application in detail.
II. ARTICLE 24: ISSUES FOR ANALYSIS
ARTICLE 24 of the Brussels Convention is in the following terms:7
Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such
provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the
law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another
Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
Commentators have identified a range of issues which may arise in
seeking to understand and give effect to these provisions. Three issues in
particular are worthy of more detailed consideration.
A. Scope of Measures Covered by Article 24
Perhaps the single most important matter concerning Article 24 is the
meaning to be given to the expression "provisional, including protective,
measures". A primary point here is whether this classification is to be
determined by each legal system in accordance with its own concepts and
principles or whether classification is made by reference to autonomous
or independent "European" principles. With regard to various key
concepts in the Convention, such as matters relating to a contract in
Article 5(1) and the idea of tort, delict or quasi-delict in Article 5(3), the
European Court of Justice has emphasised the need for autonomous
classification and interpretation.8 On the other hand, the Court has also
stated that where several identical actions have been raised under the
Convention in different countries, the question of which court is that first
seised in terms of Article 21 is a matter for national laws to determine.9
This last point has special significance in the present context for this part
of Article 21 relates to procedural matters where it would not be as easy
for the European Court to develop independent principles as is perhaps
7. The wording of Art.24 of the Lugano Convention is identical. The terms of Art.24
have remained unchanged by any of the accession treaties.
8. See e.g. Case 34/82, Peters v. ZNAV [1983] E.C.R. 987; Case C-26/91, Handle v.
TMCS [1992] E.CR. 1-3967; Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schroder Munchmeyer
Hengst & Co. [1988] E.CR. 5565; Case C-68/93, ShevUl v. Presse AUiance SA [1995] E.C.R.
1—415; Case C-364/93, Marinari v. Lloyds Bank pic (Zubaidi Trading Co. intervening) [1995]
E.CR 1-2719.
9. Case 129/83, Zelger v. SalinUri (No.2) [1984] E.C.R. 2397.
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the case when dealing with matters drawn from substantive law such as
contract or delict.
It should not be thought that this question of the basis for classification
is directly answered by the terms of Article 24 itself, which refers to
provisional including protective remedies "as may be available under the
law" of the State whose courts are granted jurisdiction under the Article.
Article 24 does not by itself create any type of provisional or protective
remedy or measure. Rather, it is concerned with such measures that exist
in the different legal systems of contracting States. But clearly it does not
follow that whilst a legal system of any contracting State provides for a
particular type of protective remedy under its internal law that remedy is
necessarily a protective or provisional remedy for the purposes of Article
24.
This point may appear obvious but is worthy of direct statement
because of the range of different types of remedy which different legal
systems classify as provisional, protective or "interim". It may be noted
that the Convention itself does not use the term interim and several
writers have argued that interim remedies which are in effect part
judgments such as interim payments or interim damages do not fall within
the range of the provisions of Article 24.10 This conclusion would be a
fortiori as regards proceedings in national law which provide for final
judgment under procedures that by-pass full-blown litigation such as
summary decree or summary judgment in Scots and English law.
At the other end of the spectrum the type of remedy which falls clearly
within the scope of Article 24 is one which freezes the defendant's assets
as security for eventual judgment in favour of the plaintiff. Other
remedies whose rationale are protective may less clearly fall within
Article 24. For example, in Scots law in certain circumstances the court
may order the defender to consign into court the whole or part of the sum
sued for to await the outcome of the action.11 However, it may be noted
that Article 24 refers to provisional, including protective, remedies; and
from this it can be inferred that its scope goes beyond measures which
protect parties during litigation with a view to securing ultimate judgment
in the case. Of particular interest here are measures which deal with
evidence. Remedies relating to the preservation of documents or other
property which has evidential value in a case are clearly protective in
nature. However, such remedies are not concerned with securing ultimate
judgment but with preserving material which has a bearing on the course
of the action. Some writers have argued that Article 24 is not concerned
10. See e.g. Collins, op. tit supra n.l, at pp.5, 37-39; P. Matthews, "Provisional and
Protective Measures in England and Ireland at Common Law and Under the Conventions:
A Comparative Survey" (1995) 14 Civil Justice Q. 190, 198-199.
11. Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice (2nd edn, 1998), pp.357-360.
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with remedies which deal with the production or recovery of evidence
during an action or for taking of evidence on commission or appointment
of an expert witness.12 A distinction can no doubt be drawn between
provisional and protective remedies which deal directly with the relation-
ship between the parties and those which are concerned with the course of
procedure of the action itself. The problem here is that some remedies
may serve both functions. For example, in Scots law the court may allow
evidence to be taken on commission where the witness is suffering from
illness or is of an advanced age. One rationale for this procedure is that
the witness may no longer be alive or will be unable to attend when a trial
is heard. Yet at the same time the report which results from examination
of the witness on commission can undoubtedly be used as evidence at the
subsequent trial.
Accordingly, what is required in order to give effect to this key point of
Article 24 is a set of principles which throw light on the range of
provisional, including protective, measures and which guide the classifi-
cation of the vast range of types of provisional remedy known to the
national legal systems of contracting States as falling within or outside the
terms of Article 24.
B. The Jurisdictional Bases of Article 24
Article 24 is contained in section 9 of Title II of the Brussels Convention
(and likewise in respect of Article 24 of the Lugano Convention). This
point is worth noting for Title II deals with the topic of jurisdiction and
Article 24 should accordingly be understood as conferring jurisdiction on
courts to grant provisional, including protective, measures in the circum-
stances referred to, viz. where a court of another contracting State has
jurisdiction under other provisions of the Convention over the substance
of the dispute. A number of issues arise from the jurisdictional nature of
Article 24. On one reading Article 24 grants jurisdiction in any one action
to courts in every contracting State and the question then arises whether it
has to be given a narrow interpretation. In interpreting various provisions
of Article 5 of the Convention, the European Court has emphasised that
the primary ground of jurisdiction under the Convention is the domicile
of the defender; since the grounds of jurisdiction in Article 5 are
derogations from that fundamental ground, the provisions of that Article
are to be read narrowly.13
This issue is linked to the earner discussion about the nature of
provisional and protective remedies covered by Article 24. If it were to be
12. Matthews, op. cit. supra n.10, at pp.197-198; Collins, op. cil supra n.l, at p37.
13. Case 33/78, Somafer v. Saar-Ferngus AC [1978] E.C.R. 2183; Case 9/87, Arcado
SPRL v. Haviland SA [1988] E.C.R. 1539; Kalfelis, supra n.8.
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established that measures which deal with the substance of the case (e.g.
interim damages) are indeed beyond the scope of Article 24, the question
of a narrow interpretation of the jurisdictional aspects of that Article
would not arise. On this basis Article 24 on its own terms would not be
concerned with jurisdiction over the substance of an action but solely with
the supplementary issue of provisional and protective remedies, and its
provisions would not derogate from any basic principle of jurisdiction
over the substance of the dispute. By contrast, there would be a
competition of jurisdiction as to the substance of an action where a court
other than that of the main proceedings issued provisional measures
(such as interim damages) which dealt, even if only on a partial or interim
basis, with the substantive outcome of the action. This approach provides
support for the view that measures which deal with the substance of a case
are beyond the scope of Article 24. The difficulty here is precisely that
there is yet no clear statement of the types of measure which fall within
the scope of that Article.
A second point is whether Article 24 by itself confers jurisdiction on
courts in contracting States to grant provisional or protective measures
or, alternatively, whether these courts require an additional jurisdictional
base before they can grant these measures. A simple reading of Article 24
is that, once there is some matter over which a court has jurisdiction as to
the substance under the Brussels Convention in an action, that fact by
itself is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on courts in other contracting
States to grant Article 24 measures. As against this view Article 24 refers
to provisional, including protective, measures which may be available
under the law of the State where application is made. This expression may
be read as referring only to the various types of provisional or protective
measure; or, alternatively, may be wider in meaning and refer to all the
circumstances appropriate for granting provisional or protective mea-
sures, including jurisdiction under national law. A further aspect of this
question is whether jurisdiction for Article 24 purposes can be based on
the exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction set out in Article 3 of the
Convention. However, these exorbitant grounds are excluded only in
relation to the rules of jurisdiction in sections 2 to 6 of Title II of the
Convention. (Article 24, it will be noted, is in section 9 of Title II.) By
implication it follows that grounds of jurisdiction other than those in
sections 2 to 6, including the exorbitant grounds mentioned in Article 3,
may be available in respect of Article 24 jurisdiction. Furthermore,
Article 3 is concerned with the situation where a person domiciled in a
contracting State may be sued in another contracting State, and the idea
of being "sued" suggests an action on a substantive matter, not a remedy
within Article 24.
C. Relationship of Article 24 to Other Provisions of the Convention
The final broad heading of issues which commentators have noted about
Article 24 concerns the relationship between that Article and other
308 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 48
provisions of the Convention. We have already noted one example of this
broad issue in the discussion of the jurisdictional bases of Article 24 and
its possible interaction with Article 3, which deals with exorbitant and
other impermissible grounds of jurisdiction. Two other main issues have
been noted about Article 24 and other provisions of the Convention.
1. Article 24 and exclusive jurisdiction
Under the jurisdiction provisions of the Convention, exclusive jurisdic-
tion (other than jurisdiction based on the defender's domicile) may arise
in two ways: under Article 16 and Article 17. Article 16 lists a number of
situations where the courts of the specified contracting States have
exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the domicile of the defender. It may be
that with the majority of Article 16 grounds, it would be difficult to
envisage provisional, including protective, measures in other legal
systems which would have a bearing on the main action (e.g. proceedings
about the validity of entries in a public register) but other Article 16
grounds may not involve this problem (e.g. proceedings concerning
immoveable property). More to the point, Article 16(5) gives exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments
to the courts of the contracting State dealing with the enforcement This
last ground may involve a fairly direct overlap with Article 24 in that in
some legal systems (as is the case in Scotland) there is no sharp distinction
between provisional measures used during an action to secure final
judgment and those post-judgment measures used to enforce it.
Similarly, Article 17 provides that where parties agree to deal with a
dispute in the court of a contracting State, that court has exclusive
jurisdiction. Does the fact that jurisdiction in an action derives from
Article 17 preclude parties from applying in other legal systems for
protective remedies under Article 24?
Again, a solution is possible if a distinction is accepted between
provisional remedies which go to the substance of a case (and which lie
outside the scope of Article 24) and such remedies which do not go to the
substance (and therefore which fall within the Article's scope). It can then
be argued that this distinction is recognised in Title II of the Brussels
Convention. Jurisdiction over substantive issues is dealt with in sections 1
to 6 (i.e. Articles 2 to 18), and there are other secondary or subsidiary
matters which are concerned with other aspects of jurisdiction. Sections 7,
8 and 9 (which contains Article 24) are not concerned with the allocation
of jurisdiction in substantive proceedings but with issues arising from the
preceding sections. On that basis, the fact that a court in one contracting
State has exclusive jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute does not
preclude application elsewhere under Article 24 for provisional, includ-
ing protective, measures in respect of that litigation.
2. Article 24 and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
Title III of the Brussels Convention contains provisions on the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Judgments for this purpose
APRIL 1999] Article 24 of the Brussels Convention 309
are defined widely as including any judgment given by a court of a
contracting State, including judgments under that name but also a decree,
order, decision or writ of execution. Accordingly, a court order or
judgment in relation to a provisional, including protective, measure
would come within the scope of the recognition and enforcement
provisions of the Convention. The question that arises, however, is
whether the recognition and enforcement provisions were intended to
have any application to Article 24 measures or were meant to be
restricted to judgments of courts with jurisdiction over the substantive
disputes. Since Article 24 confers jurisdiction on courts in all contracting
States in addition to that of the court of the substantive action, it could be
argued that there is no necessity for enforcing a provisional or protective
measure beyond the country of the forum which provided it. Thus, where
an action is raised in Germany, the plaintiff can seek provisional measures
in that country. If he wishes to seek protective measures as regards assets
in France, there is no need to enforce the German protective measures in
France but the plaintiff can make application in France for the equivalent
provisional, including protective, measure under French law. A similar
course of action would follow for each contracting State where a
provisional, including protective, measure was sought so that the plaintiff
would have no need to enforce the German (or indeed the French)
provisional, including protective, measure in Spain but could make a
further Article 24 application in the Spanish courts.
This issue is not necessarily dependent on whether or not the
provisional or protective measure granted in one legal system has
extraterritorial effect as far as concerns that system. Much depends here
on how the extraterritorial effect is deemed to work. For example, the
Mareva injunction of English law has effect in respect of assets situated
beyond England but Mareva injunctions are worked through by the
personal obligations imposed on the enjoined party and not by attaching
the property or placing restrictions on it (whether in England or
elsewhere). On the other hand, if a provisional or protective measure
purports to have effect on property situated beyond the legal system of
the court granting it, this will not be effective until an appropriate remedy
is obtained in the country of the situs. This last consideration by itself does
not necessarily indicate that provisional and protective measures are
covered by the provisions of the Convention on recognition and
enforcement, for it still leaves open the possibility of separate application
in the country of the situs for provisional or protective measures in that
legal system. The crucial point here is not whether by the law of the
country of the original provisional or protective measure the remedy has
extraterritorial effect but whether it is a type with no exact equivalent in
the law of the situs. In this situation there may be advantages in seeking to
have the original measure enforced in the country of the situs under the
310 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 48
Convention provisions, although any gain here would depend on the
courts of the situs enforcing the measure in precisely the way the measure
itself provides.
A further point in the argument whether and to what extent the
recognition and enforcement provisions of the Brussels Convention
apply to Article 24 measures concerns the exact procedure for enforce-
ment which the Convention contains. Where application is made for the
enforcement of judgments in another contracting State, the application is
dealt with expeditiously. There are only limited grounds for refusing an
application which is heard ex parte and the party against whom
enforcement is sought is given notice only once enforcement is author-
ised. In this situation that party is given the right to appeal against the
authorisation of enforcement. Under Article 39, until any such appeal is
made or dealt with, the original applicant for enforcement cannot enforce
the judgment apart from using "protective measures against the pro-
perty" of the other party. Several points arise from the possible
interaction of Articles 24 and 39. First, the consequences appear very odd
if Article 24 remedies are indeed subject to the Convention's recognition
and enforcement procedures. An applicant for enforcement cannot take
full enforcement measures until the appeal period expires or any appeal
lodged is dealt with but, as already noted, may take protective measures.
But if the original judgment itself is a protective measure this leads to
using protective measures to support protective measures. Second,
Article 39 deals only with the situation where enforcement has been
authorised. There may still be circumstances where Article 24 remedies
are granted after judgment in the main action has been pronounced but
before steps are taken to enforce it either in the country of the original
forum or elsewhere.14 Third, the types of measure referred to in Article 39
are possibly narrower in scope than those of Article 24. Article 39 does
not include the wider category of provisional measures, only those which
are protective in nature; furthermore, Article 39 is restricted to remedies
which are taken against the property of the party against whom
enforcement is sought. This would therefore exclude protective measures
which do not affect the property rights of that party. It is important to be
clear as to the impact which this restriction might have on particular types
of protective remedy used in the legal systems of the United Kingdom.
For example, the English remedy of the Mareva injunction has no
consequences on the real rights of the property of the enjoined party,
whose liability for breach of the injunction is personal.
III. GUIDANCE FROM THE INTERPRETATIVE REPORTS AND THE CASE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
A. The Interpretative Reports
Very little guidance is given to the solution of these sorts of problem in the
14. G. Hogan, "The Judgments Convention and Mareva Injunctions in the United
Kingdom and Ireland" (1989) 14 E.L-Rev. 191,197-200.
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various reports on the Conventions and accession treaties. The Jenard
Report15 notes that, as regards the measures which may be taken under
Article 24, reference is to be made to the internal law of the country to
which application is made. This view suggests, though in hardly conclus-
ive terms, that classification of a remedy as being provisional, including
protective, is not something to be done on an autonomous, independent
basis. The Schlosser Report16 notes the variety of provisional, including
protective, measures in the laws of Ireland and the United Kingdom
which may give rise to difficulties where these measures are to be
enforced in another contracting State. This statement clearly presupposes
that Article 24 measures are subject to the recognition and enforcement
provisions of the Convention.17
B. European Court of Justice Decisions
Article 24 has been the direct focus for decision by the Court in several
cases, though a number of other decisions have thrown incidental light on
certain aspects of the place of provisional and protective measures in the
Brussels Convention. However, despite the existing jurisprudence of the
Court, to date many important issues concerning Article 24 remain
subject to speculation.
1. The nature of provisional, including protective, measures
Four cases deal with the issue of what constitutes a provisional,
including protective, measure. In Reichert and others v. Dresdner Bank
AG18 a German bank raised an "action paulienne" in France against two
persons of German domicile in respect of a transfer of property situated
in France. The transfer was said to have been made contrary to the rights
of the bank as the creditor of the defenders. One basis for the French
court's jurisdiction, it was argued, was Article 24 and this in turn involved
the characterisation of the action paulienne in French law as a provisional,
including protective, measure. In argument various parties referred to the
passage in the Jenard Report that reference was to be made to the
internal law of the forum as regards provisional and protective measures
15. (1979) OJ. C59/1,42, section 9.
16. (1979) O J. C59/71,126, para.183. Schlosser also notes (p.134, para.221) in discussing
Aru39 that the Convention does not guarantee specific measures of enforcement, or the
procedure used to obtain them (e.g. application to the court, or a huisser or similar
institution).
17. The Evrigemis and Kerameus Report notes that jurisdiction to grant a provisional,
including protective, measure is in principle separate from jurisdiction in the substantive
action but does not pursue the implications of this distinction (1986) OJ. C298/a, 3. The
Cruz, Real and Jenard Report contains no discussion of Art24 (1990) O J. C189/35,38, nor
does the Jenard and Moller Report on the Lugano Convention (1990) OJ. C189/57,61.
18. Case C-261/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-2149.
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as well as to various writings in French law which supported the
characterisation of the action paulienne as a protective measure.
It was accepted that the action paulienne in French law was a remedy
available only to a creditor who claimed that a transfer of property by a
debtor was in breach of his interests and that, as regards protection of
those interests and only for that purpose, the transaction was rendered
void by the judgment in the action. The European Court set out a general
description of a provisional, including protective, measure as one
intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights
which were subject to litigation elsewhere in a court with jurisdiction over
the substance of the matter. The Court held that the action paulienne in
French law did not meet this description because its effect went beyond
merely preserving some factual or legal situation but actually varied the
legal situation (i.e. position) of the relevant assets by revoking the prior
transaction. It may be noted that the Court did not consider itself bound
by the characterisation of the action paulienne in French law in deciding
whether that remedy satisfied the definition of a provisional or protective
measure and instead seemed to be saying that this issue of characteris-
ation would be made on an independent basis.19 The problem with the
Reichert v. Dresdner Bank definition of a provisional or protective
measure as a measure preserving a factual or legal situation is that it does
not sit easily with forms of protective measure which though prohibitory
in effect also act to confer a preference on the creditor using them.
In CHW v. G/H20 a court in the Netherlands made an order for the
delivery by one party to another of a document of evidential value in a
dispute between the parties. Under the law of the Netherlands this
remedy was classified as a form of interim relief in interlocutory
proceedings. The question arose whether it came within the scope of
Article 24. The Court did not give this question a direct answer and
instead issued a response dealing with the question of the scope of the
subject matters of the Convention. However, no objection was made to
the idea that an order in respect of preservation of evidence could be
regarded as a provisional or protective measure.
Another aspect of the definition of a provisional or protective measure
as set out in Reichert is that such a measure itself must fall within the scope
of the Brussels Convention. However, it is not clear that this requirement
has any effect in relation to Article 24 measures. In De CaveP1 a divorce
action was raised in France and the French court granted an order
19. The independent basis of characterisation of a provisional, including protective,
measure for the purposes of Art24 was made in argument by the European Commission in
CHW v. GJH, infra n.20, at p.1195.
20. Case 25/81, [1982] E.CR. 1189.
21. Case 143/78, De Cavel v. De Cavel (No.l) [1979] E.CR. 1055.
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freezing the property of the parties in Germany, including a bank account
there. The question arose whether this order was subject to the
recognition and enforcement provisions of the Brussels Convention.
Clearly matters relating to the status of natural persons or to matrimonial
property are outside the scope of the Convention by virtue of Article 1,
but it was argued that the protective orders of the French court were
orders of a separate type and fell within the scope of the Convention. The
Court held that whether or not a judgment or order fell within the scope
of the Convention applied equally to definitive judgments as to pro-
visional or protective orders but, as regards the latter, the question of
inclusion in the Convention was to be determined not so much by the
nature of the measure itself but more by the type of rights it was seeking to
protect. In De Cavel, accordingly, it was held that the order of the French
court was concerned with rights relating to matrimonial property and thus
was outside the scope of the Convention.22 However, the Court also
pointed out that this issue (i.e. whether a provisional or protective
measure falls within the scope of the Convention) did not involve Article
24 as that Article came into play only where there was a court in another
contracting State which clearly had jurisdiction under the Convention
over the substance of the dispute. The question then is: where Article 24
does apply (i.e. there is a court in another contracting State with
jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute), does there require to be
consideration of provisional or protective measures as relating to rights or
interests concerning a topic not within the scope of the Convention? In
CHW v. GJH the Court stated that Article 24 could not be relied on to
bring within the scope of the Convention provisional or protective
measures relating to matters excluded from it. This statement must be
read in the context of the facts of that case. The Court had held that a
provisional order in connection with a document which could have
evidential value did not come within the scope of the Convention because
the matter to which it related was one of the topics excluded from the
Convention.23 The statement about Article 24 was made to rebut an
argument that that Article could itself bring such an order within the
scope of the Convention. However, its essential point is that on the facts
of the case Article 24 did not apply as there was no court in another
contracting State which had jurisdiction over the substance of the case.
Finally, the van Uden case concerned a dispute between van Uden, a
company based in the Netherlands, and a German company, Deco-Line.
The parties had concluded a contract in terms of which Deco-Line were
22. See also Case 120/79, De Cavel v. De Cavel (No.2) [1980] E.C.R. 731, which reached
the same conclusion as regards an interlocutory order for payment of maintenance during
the divorce action.
23. I.e. rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship.
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due to make various payments to van Uden. The contract also contained
an arbitration clause. Van Uden claimed that Deco-Line had refused to
make payments of invoices and raised arbitration proceedings in the
Netherlands pursuant to the contract. At the same time van Uden also
applied to the courts in the Netherlands to obtain measures by way of
interim relief. The measure sought, and granted, required Deco-Iine to
make payment of a specified sum of money to cover the debts due under
the contract and which were the subject matter of the arbitration
proceedings. Deco-Line disputed the basis on which this order was made
and eventually, on appeal to the Hoge Raad, reference was made to the
European Court for a preliminary ruling on a number of issues.
One of these issues was the nature of the order for interim payment as a
provisional or protective measure in Article 24. In van Uden the Court
accepted the description of provisional and protective measures given in
Reichert v. Dresdner Bank but held that it was not possible to state in a
general or abstract manner whether an order for interim payment of a
contract debt did or did not fall within the scope of Article 24. In some
cases an order of this type might well protect a plaintiffs position.
However, the Court also noted that orders for interim payment might
have more than a merely protective function. The Court accepted that
very often an order for interim payment would pre-empt the decision on
the substance of the dispute, and this would be even more likely where the
order was made by the courts of a plaintiffs domicile rather than by the
courts of the defendant's domicile. However, the Court held that an order
for interim payment could be covered by Article 24 where it was truly
protective of the plaintiffs interest and no more. For this to arise two
preconditions had to be met. The first is that the defendant must be
guaranteed repayment of the sums paid by him under the interim order if
the plaintiff is unsuccessful on the substance of the claim. The second is
that the order is restricted to specific assets of the defendant which are
located in the territory of the court making the interim order.24
2. Basis of jurisdiction
Several decisions of the European Court have touched upon the nature
of the jurisdictional base of Article 24 orders. In De Cavel v. De Cavel
(No.l) the Court stressed that the terms of Article 24 itself require that
jurisdiction under that Article arises only where the court in another
contracting State has jurisdiction under the Convention over the sub-
stance of the matter.25 What Article 24 does not specify is whether that
other court must actually have exercised or be about to exercise its
Convention-based jurisdiction or, alternatively, whether it suffices that
24. Van Uden, supra n.6, at paras J7-39.
25. De Cavel (No.l), supra n21, at p.1067; De Cavel (No. 2), supra n.22, at 740.
APRIL 1999] Article 24 of the Brussels Convention 315
such a court exists though no action is likely or in contemplation. This
point is involved in the somewhat puzzling background to CHW v. GJH.
This case concerned two actions (one of divorce, the other relating to the
parties' property) both proceeding in the Netherlands between two
Dutch nationals who were resident in Belgium. Doubts arose as to
whether the Dutch courts had jurisdiction and one of the grounds of
jurisdiction argued for was based on Article 24. It might have been
thought that the most straightforward response to this type of argument
was that Article 24 did not apply because there was no action proceeding
or about to proceed in another contracting State over the substance of the
dispute to which the Dutch court's jurisdiction related by way of a
provisional or protective measure. On hearing the report of the Judge
Rapporteur and the opinion of the Advocate General, the Court itself did
query why the issue of the application of Article 24 was being raised.26
However, in its decision the Court, while noting that Article 24 refers to
the court of another contracting State having jurisdiction over the
substance of the matter, dismissed the argument in the following way:27
That provision in fact has in view cases in which provisional measures are
ordered in a Contracting State where "under this Convention" a court of
another Contracting State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
Therefore it may not be relied on to bring within the scope of the
Convention provisional or protective measures relating to matters which
are excluded from it.
The basis of jurisdiction under Article 24 was also touched upon in the
van Uden reference, where the Court made two points. The first
concerned the situation, as in that case, where the court dealing with the
Article 24 application based its jurisdiction on one of the grounds of
jurisdiction prohibited by Article 3 of the Brussels Convention. The
Court accepted the argument that, as Article 24 was not contained in
sections 2 to 6 of Title II of the Convention, the prohibited grounds of
jurisdiction in Article 3 did not apply to Article 24 applications.
More problematic in the van Uden case is the second of the Court's
views on jurisdiction and Article 24. The Court noted that where a court
had jurisdiction under the Convention it may use its normal range of
powers relating to protective and provisional remedies, and no issue of
the jurisdictional basis of this power would arise. However, in that case
the parties' contract contained an arbitration clause, and indeed arbi-
tration proceedings had commenced, and accordingly any application for
protective measures could be based only on Article 24. Somewhat
surprisingly, the Court held that the existence of the arbitration clause or
26. CHW, supra n.20, at p.l 194.
27. Idem, p.1204.
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of the arbitration proceedings did not preclude the application of Article
24. It argued that what the measures envisaged by Article 24 were
concerned with were rights of a sort which fell within the scope of the
Convention, such as in the present case rights under a contract. The
measure sought by van Uden was not in any sense ancillary to the
arbitration proceedings themselves but were, rather, protective of their
contractual rights. It therefore followed that Article 24 conferred
jurisdiction on the Netherlands court, despite the arbitration proceed-
ings, as the provisional measure related to a right of van Uden's which fell
within the scope of the Convention.28 This reasoning is, to say the least, far
from convincing. It is simply not possible to reconcile this part of the
Court's decision with the clear words of Article 24 itself. That Article
gives jurisdiction in respect of protective and provisional measures to the
courts of one contracting State, where the courts of another contracting
State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the dispute. But in the
present case the effect of the arbitration clause was that no court of any
contracting State could have jurisdiction. In these circumstances one
would have thought that Article 24 had no application at all.
3. Recognition and enforcement
A further broad issue is the relationship between Article 24 and the
recognition and enforcement provisions of the Convention. No case has
ruled directly on the point that an Article 24 measure could be the subject
of enforcement in a contracting State other than that in which it was
pronounced. However, it seems clear that an Article 24 order could meet
the requirements for enforcement under the provisions of Title III of the
Convention. The decision in Denaulier v. Couchet Frires® is of some
significance in this respect. In that case a French court which was the court
with jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute made a provisional
order freezing assets of the defendant in Germany.10 The European Court
held that a provisional order of this sort was one which could be subject to
the recognition and enforcement provisions. However, the Court stressed
that, as with other types of judgment, a provisional order would have to
satisfy the requirements of Article 27, which states that for a judgment to
be enforced under the Convention the defendant must have been given
sufficient notice of the action. While it was accepted that the whole point
of a provisional or protective measure often requires that the order is
obtained on an exparte basis, nonetheless the Court rejected an argument
that because of this feature of provisional orders the requirements of
notice under Article 27 should not apply to them.
28. Van Uden, supra n.6, at paras.19-25, 28-34.
29. Case 125/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1553.
30. In De Cavel (No.]), supra n.21, a similar sort of order was made.
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This decision concerned provisional orders made as part of the main
action but in principle exactly the same reasoning would apply to
provisional or protective measures made on the basis of Article 24
jurisdiction. Indeed the general rationale of Article 24 orders is touched
upon in the arguments used in this case. For example, it was argued that if
provisional measures in the main action were automatically covered by
the recognition and enforcement provisions of the Convention, Article 24
would be redundant. Indeed the opposite was the case. Given that
provisional and protective measures usually involved ex parte appli-
cations, which meant that they could not be enforced in a different
contracting State from that where granted, the remedy of the party who
had obtained it was to make application under Article 24 for a provisional
or protective measure in every State where such a measure was required.
This procedure would protect the plaintiffs interests in obtaining a
protective remedy at speed in relative secrecy. Furthermore, it was
argued that Article 24 might in this situation provide a more suitable
procedure than would result from using the recognition and enforcement
provisions of the Convention in enforcing a provisional measure from the
court of the substantive action. Provisional measures involve'a balancing
of the interests of both litigants, and the relative weight to be attached to
providing security for ultimate judgment to the plaintiff as against
avoiding unfair prejudice to the defendant's use of his assets, is something
better achieved by a local court, often after fuller enquiry than that
possible by using the Convention's enforcement procedures. At the same
time it was admitted that this scheme of subsidiarity for provisional and
protective measures would be effective only if the measures in each
contracting State were similar in effect.
This idea of subsidiarity was also touched upon in van Uden, where the
Court was dealing with an order for interim payment. The Court stated
that the granting of a measure under Article 24 would be conditional
upon a real connecting link between the subject matter of the measure
and the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted it. Furthermore,
the Court held that the classification of an order for interim payment of a
disputed contractual debt as a measure covered by Article 24 depended in
part on whether the measure related to specific assets of the defendant
which were located in the territorial jurisdiction of the court granting the
measure.31 Implicit in this description of a protective measure is the view
that a measure of this particular type does not call for enforcement
outside the country in which it was granted. However, in van Uden the
Court did not need to consider the use of the recognition and enforce-
ment provisions of the Convention in respect of other types of protective
measure.
31. Van Uden, supra n.6, at paras.39-47.
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Two further problems about enforcing provisional measures, whether
pronounced in the main action or under Article 24, may be mentioned.
One is that for a judgment to be enforced under the Convention there
must be produced a document showing that under the law of the State of
origin the judgment is "enforceable". In Brennero v. Wendel it was noted
that in certain legal systems (as in this case under Italian law) a
provisional measure could not be declared enforceable as such until final
judgment was given.32 Second, in the same case it was pointed out in
argument that problems might arise from the application of Articles 38
and 39 to provisional and protective orders. Article 39 refers to the
procedure whereby, once initial authority is given for enforcement in the
State of enforcement, a period is allowed for appeal against that decision.
Until such an appeal is finally disposed of only protective measures
against the property of the judgment debtor may be taken. This provision
does not sit easily with enforcement of a judgment which itself is only
provisional in nature.
IV. APPROACHES IN BRITAIN
A. England and Wales
1. The statutory provisions
To appreciate how Article 24 operates in English (as indeed in Scots)
law it is necessary to bear in mind that by UK law an international
convention which has been signed by the UK government has no effect in
internal law in the United Kingdom until legislation has been passed to
give effect to the terms of the convention. As far as the Brussels
Convention is concerned this process was brought about by the enact-
ment of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. By section 2 of the
1982 Act the Brussels Convention has full effect in the United Kingdom.33
Accordingly, Article 24 is part of the different legal systems in the United
Kingdom.34 However, further specific provisions on provisional and
protective measures are contained in the 1982 Act and for English law
these are to be found in section 25 of the Act, which allows the High Court
to grant provisional and protective remedies in the absence of substantive
32. Case 258/83, [1984] 3 E.C.R. 3971, 3980.
33. This applies to the Brussels Convention itself, the 1971 Protocol on the ECJ, and the
various accession treaties. The texts of these various conventions are set out in Schedules to
the 1982 Act
34. Sched.4 to the 1982 Act contains a modified version of the Brussels Convention as
amended in respect of inter-UK jurisdiction. Where the provisions of an article in Sched.4
are identical to those of the Brussels Convention (as is the case with the respective versions
of Art.24), the courts in the UK are in effect under a duty to apply the caselaw of the ECJ in
questions of interpretation of Sched.4: Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Glasgow City Council [1997]
4 All E.R. 641, 646, 660,667.
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proceedings in England or Wales. Earlier, the House of Lords decision in
The Siskina*5 precluded the grant of interim measures in cases in which
the English courts did not have jurisdiction over the substance. This was
effectively superseded to a great extent by the introduction of section
25(1) of the 1982 Act, which sought to bring into effect Article 24 of the
Convention by giving the English courts power to grant interim relief
where:
(1) proceedings have been or are to be commenced in the courts of
another contracting State or in any part of the United Kingdom
outside England and Wales;36 and
(2) their subject matter is within the scope of the Brussels or
Lugano Convention.
The power under section 25(1) has recently been extended by two
important developments. First, the Arbitration Act 1996 extends the
power in respect of foreign arbitral proceedings.37 Even more import-
antly, power exists under section 25(3) of the 1982 Act to extend the
power to grant interim relief granted by section 25(1) in respect of
non-contracting States and matters not governed by either Convention.
This power has been exercised by way of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982 (Interim Relief) Order 1997.38 As a result, interim
relief "may now be sought from the English court in support of court or
arbitral proceedings which are to be, or have been, instituted anywhere in
the world without the need to establish any basis upon which the English
court could assert jurisdiction as to the substance".39 In addition, interim
relief may now be granted even where the subject matter of the
proceedings is not a civil or commercial matter. Accordingly, section 25
now provides for jurisdiction in Article 24 cases and situations falling
35. Siskina (Cargo Owners) v. Distos Cia Naviera SA (The Siskina) [1977] 3 AU E.R.
803.
36. As amended by para.12 of Sched.2 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991
(c.12). It should be noted that s.25 also applies in relation to proceedings which have been or
are to be commenced in a part of the UK other than that in which the High Court exercises
jurisdiction.
37. S.25(3)(c) of the 1982 Act (which allows for the extension of s^5(l) measures to
arbitration proceedings) was repealed by S.107(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 with effect
from 31 Jan. 1997. However, by a combination of ss.2 and 44(3) of that Act certain forms of
interim relief can now be granted in support of foreign arbitration proceedings.
38. S.I. 1997/302. This effectively reversed the decision in Mercedes Benz ACv. Leiduck
[1996] A.C. 284. For discussion see D. Capper, "The Trans-Jurisdictional effects of Mareva
Injunctions" (1996) 15 Civil Justice Q. 211. The important effect of the extended power
provided by this Order in relation to interim relief in the context of international insolvency
litigation has been noted by P. St J. Smart, "Insolvency Proceedings and the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982" (1998) 18 Civil Justice Q. 149.
39. A. Lenon, "Mareva Injunctions in Support of Foreign Proceedings" (1997) New LJ.
1234,1234. See also Practice and Procedure (1997) 16 Civil Justice Q. 185.
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outside Article 24. The only reference to the exercise of the discretion in
granting interim relief under section 25(1) is provided in section 25(2):
On an application for any interim relief under subsection (1), the court may
refuse to grant that relief, if, in the opinion of the court, the fact that the
court has no jurisdiction apart from this section in relation to the
subject-matter of the proceedings makes it inexpedient for the court to
grant it.
Unfortunately, there has been little discussion of the discretion which
exists under Section 25 (except in relation to extraterritorial interim relief
discussed below), in comparison with the exercise of the jurisdiction to
grant interim relief in non-section 25 situations.
2. Interim relief and "provisional, including protective, measures"
The text of Article 24 does not provide a definition of what constitutes
provisional, including protective, measures and the European Court has
yet to provide a definitive ruling on the scope of the term. Further, the
relevant statutory provisions bringing Article 24 into effect do not
provide the English courts with any detailed guidance as to what forms of
"provisional, including protective, measures" are covered. Indeed, sec-
tion 25 does not utilise the terminology adopted in Article 24 but refers to
"interim relief, which is itself denned negatively. Section 25(7) provides
that the interim relief which may be granted under section 25(1) is:
interim relief of any kind which thatcourthas power to grant in proceedings
relating to matters within its jurisdiction, other than—
(a) a warrant for the arrest of property; or
(b) provision for obtaining evidence.
Two issues require to be considered briefly here. First, what are the
broad range of types of interim relief available generally in the English
courts, and, second, to what extent do they constitute provisional,
including protective, measures for the purposes of Article 24? Readers
are referred to both O'Malley and Layton40 and Rose*1 for more detailed
consideration of the types of interim relief available in various European
systems, including England. However, it is clear that the principal form of
interim relief available in the English courts is the interlocutory or interim
injunction, often granted on an exparte basis, and the power to grant this
generic form of relief exists under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act
1981. Of this general category, perhaps the most significant type of
interlocutory injunction is the Mareva injunction. Another type of interim
measure which has gained prominence in recent years is the Anton Piller
40. S. O'Malley and A. Layton, European Civil Practice (1989).
41. N. Rose (Ed.), Pre-Emptive Remedies in Europe (1992).
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order. The basis of the Anton Piller order is the directions which the order
may include to direct any person to permit anyone described in the order
to enter premises and on those premises to carry out a range of tasks, for
instance search and take copies of relevant documentation. The court's
jurisdiction for granting Anton Piller orders has now been given a
statutory basis by section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997. Section 7
states that the court may make an order for the purpose of securing, in the
case of any existing or proposed proceedings in court (a) the preservation
of any relevant evidence or (b) the preservation of property which may be
the subject matter of proceedings or in relation to which any question may
arise in the proceedings. However, in the context of interim relief in aid of
foreign proceedings, section 25(7) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act 1982 excludes issues relating to the gathering of evidence from the
forms of interim relief which may be granted under section 25. This may
have the effect that Anton Piller orders cannot be granted in connection
with Article 24, but the position is uncertain.
No clear guidance has been given, by either statute or the courts, as to
whether the term "interim relief covers certain types of monetary award,
as for example interim damages, where an interim award is made where
liability is admitted or the court is satisfied the plaintiff will recover, and
provisional damages where the plaintiff may apply at a later stage for the
damages issue to be reconsidered/2 There has been no case law involving
orders for interim damages or provisional damages under section 25 in
the English courts. It is unlikely that the latter will be deemed to
constitute interim relief and, with respect to interim damages, even if they
fall within section 25(1) as interim relief, the English courts are likely to
adopt a fairly conservative approach to this issue where they do not have
jurisdiction over the substance and utilise the inexpediency proviso in
section 25.
The extent to which an English court is "required" to provide remedies
under Article 24 was considered in Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier.43 In that
case, Staughton LJ, in the Court of Appeal, suggested that the Conven-
tion required a contracting State court to provide such measures as it may
have granted if it was dealing with the substance of the action.44 This view
was approved by Leggatt LJ in an obiter statement in Alltrans Inc. v.
Interdoms Holding Ltd45 in the Court of Appeal. In that case the
interrelationship between Article 24 and section 25 was considered. This
was important as proceedings had been commenced in the Netherlands
42. See O'MaUey and Layton, op. ciL supra n.40, at p. 1448.
43. [1989] 1 AU E.R. 456.
44. Idem, p.463. Nonetheless the "requirement" to provide provisional, including
protective, remedies, under Art.24 has been doubted by Collins, op. c'a. supra n.l, at p.37.
45. [1991] 4 All E.R. 458,468.
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before the Accession Convention had come into effect and it was argued
therefore that the English court did not have jurisdiction as Article 24 did
not apply to the proceedings. However, the court confirmed that section
25 and Article 24 are not co-extensive and section 25 provided the English
courts with a wider jurisdiction to grant interim relief. This was clearly
confirmed by the introduction of the provisions in the Arbitration Act
1996 and the 1997 Order under section 25(3) of the 1982 Act.
(a) Granting Mareva injunctions in non-section 25 cases. A Mareva
injunction is a court order restraining the defendant from disposing of
assets held by him in such a way as to defeat an award the plaintiff is likely
to obtain if successful in his action.46 The basis of the Mareva injunction is
that it is an in personam order directing the defendant not to deal with or
dispose of any assets, particularly bank accounts. The court has discretion
to tailor the order as appropriate, for instance to pay legal fees or
payments in the regular course of business. It is important to note that
third parties such as banks may be subject to contempt of court if they
contribute or act in such a way as to breach the injunction where they are
aware of its existence. In the exercise of the power by the courts to grant a
Mareva injunction a number of key characteristics have emerged. In
particular a plaintiff must show that he has a good arguable case,47 and
that there is a real risk that the defendant may remove or conceal his
assets or deal with them so as to defeat the plaintiffs claim.48 Generally,
the courts are required to be satisfied that the balance of convenience is in
favour of the grant of the injunction.49
The Mareva injunction was traditionally confined to assets within the
jurisdiction but in recent years it has been extended in scope to assets
located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the English courts. This
expansion may have important repercussions in an Article 24 context and
it is instructive to consider how the discretion is exercised in relation to
extraterritorial, often referred to as worldwide, Mareva injunctions.50 The
requirements for an extraterritorial Mareva injunction are differentiated
46. The name is derived from the relief granted in Mareva Compania Naviera SA v.
International Bulk Carriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509. Its statutory basis is now founded
in the Supreme Court Act 1981, s.37(3).
47. Rasu Maritima SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Miniyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara
(The Pentamina) [1978] Q.B. 644.
48. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA [1979] 2 All E.R. 972. Furthermore,
the plaintiff must give an undertaking in damages in case either he fails on the merits of the
action or the injunction turns out to be unjustified {ibid).
49. American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] A.C. 396.
50. See L. Collins, "The Territorial Reach of Mareva Injunctions" (1989) 105 L.Q.R.
262; A. Zuckerman, "Mareva Injunctions and Security for Judgment in a Framework of
Interlocutory Remedies" (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 432; D. Capper, "Worldwide Mareva Injunc-
tions" (1991)54 M.L.R. 329; P. Kaye, "Extraterritorial Mareva Orders and the Relevance of
Enforceability" (1990) 9 Civil Justice Q. 12.
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only by the absence of the requirement that the defendant has assets
within the jurisdiction and by the specific limitations which may be
imposed in an extraterritorial Mareva. There has been constant debate,
particularly over the last ten years, regarding such "extraterritorial"
Mareva injunctions. As it had been developed over the years, the Mareva
injunction has been subjected to criticism that, because it operates in
personam, it will be difficult in any case to enforce it abroad and this factor
alone should militate against extraterritorial application.51
Nonetheless, four important Court of Appeal cases in the late 1980s
helped to clarify the principles upon which the jurisdiction to grant
Mareva and ancillary orders in respect of foreign assets would be
exercised.52 One factor which is apparent in this discussion is that the
courts have not made a clear distinction in the criteria to be applied
between situations where the English court has jurisdiction over the
substance and those in which it does not. Of particular note is the
judgment of Kerr LJ in Babanaft International Co. SA v. Bassatne and
another.P That case neither involved the application of section 25 nor did
it involve pre-trial interim relief, but instead a post-judgment Mareva
injunction. In that context it was held that the court had jurisdiction to
grant a Mareva injunction over foreign assets but the Mareva injunction
would not be unqualified because of the exorbitant nature of the
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction in relation to third parties outside
the jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction would be subject to the
"Babanaft proviso", as it became known, by providing that it did not
affect the rights of third parties.5* In a discussion which was mainly obiter
Kerr LJ considered that the grant of Mareva injunctions in respect of
assets beyond the jurisdiction would depend on the existence of
reciprocal enforcement arrangements with the legal system where the
assets were located. This approach has been adopted in subsequent case
law to the effect that extraterritorial Mareva injunctions will be granted
subject to the discretion of the courts, this discretion being exercised in
accordance with the principle of enforceability.55 However, it was also
51. This point is discussed in the articles cited in the preceding footnote.
52. Babanaft International Co. SA v. Bassatne [1989] 1 All E.R. 433; Duvalier, supra
n.43; Derby & Co. Ltd v. Weldon (No.l) [1989] 1 All E.R. 469 and Derby & Co. Ltd v.
Weldon (NosJ and 4) [1990] 2 Ch. 65.
53. [1989] 1 All E.R. 433.
54. The same principles apply to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to a pre-trial
worldwide injunction, according to Kerr LJ at idem, pp.441 and 447. In addition Kerr LJ
suggested that a Mareva injunction covering assets abroad should provide that it does not
affect third parties except to the extent that the order is enforced by the courts of the State in
which the defendant's assets are located; idem, pp.441-442 and 447.
55. These principles were applied in Derby & Co. Ltd and Others v. Weldon and Others
(No. 1), supra n.52. tt should be noted that this principle of enforceability may allow a
distinction to be drawn between s.25 cases which fall within Art24 and s.25 cases which do
not.
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emphasised in early case law that extraterritorial Mareva injunctions
would be granted only where the circumstances were exceptional.56
(b) Mareva injunctions in section 25 cases. The plaintiff will have to
satisfy the same requirements under section 25 as noted above in order to
obtain a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign proceedings. In this regard,
the requirement that there must exist a good arguable case may raise
difficulties in the context of an action which may be commenced in
relation to the substance in a foreign court. It should be noted that Article
24 is not relevant in all section 25 cases, because the interim relief sought
may not constitute a "provisional, including protective, measure" or
because the relief is sought under the amendments introduced to Section
25 by the 1997 Order or the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996. In any
event, section 25(2) provides that the court shall have discretion in
exercising its jurisdiction to grant interim relief under section 25(1). The
question then arises whether there has been any difference in the
approach of the English courts to cases in which the English court does
not have jurisdiction over the substance, irrespective of whether Article
24 is involved. A brief answer is that not only has there been no distinction
in approach between the different situations, but the distinction has not
been accorded any particular significance.
In Babanaft, as noted above, Kerr LJ stressed that the grant of an
extraterritorial Mareva injunction, sought post-judgment in an action in
which the English court had jurisdiction in the main action, will normally
depend on the existence of some form of reciprocal arrangements for the
enforcement of such orders. In particular Kerr LJ pointed to the
possibility of enforcing provisional measures under Article 24 through
the mechanisms of Article 25 of the Convention, which treats such
measures as enforceable judgments provided they are inter partes
orders.57 This interpretation is perhaps not what the European Court
intended in Denilauer.5* Accordingly, on the basis of Babanaft as applied
in later cases, extraterritorial interim relief can be granted subject to the
discretion of the courts, this discretion being exercised in accordance with
the principle of enforceability, bearing in mind the enforcement pro-
visions for extraterritorial inter partes measures under the Convention.
As Kaye noted,59 this does not appear to be the intention of the
Convention drafters or of the European Court in Denilauer and indeed
the proposed reforms to the Brussels Convention seek to limit the
possibility of extraterritorial enforcement of provisional, including pro-
tective, measures.
56. Sec Rosseel NV v. Oriental Commercial Shipping (UK) Limited [1990] 3 All E.R.
545.
57. Babanaft, supra n-52, at pp.442-445.
58. Supra n29.
59. See Kaye, op. cit supra n.50, at pp.14-16.
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The position of extraterritorial Mareva injunctions under section 25 of
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 in the context of the
applicabili ty of Article 24 was first considered directly in Republic of Haiti
v. Duvalier.*0 An extraterritorial Mareva injunction was granted subject
to the Babanaft proviso, which was itself modified such that it applied only
to assets and acts done outside England and Wales and not to individuals
resident in England and Wales. Importantly, Staughton LJ discussed the
court's discretion, which arises in two ways.61 First, as in all cases, the
court has to consider whether it is just and convenient to grant interim
relief under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Second, section
25(2) of the 1982 Act provides that the court may refuse to grant interim
relief where it would be inexpedient to grant such relief. In exercising this
discretion Staughton LJ focused on two factors. First, he found as
determinative "the plain and admitted intention of the defendants to
move their assets out of the reach of the courts of law, coupled with the
resources they have obtained and the skill they have hitherto shown in
doing that, and the vast amounts of money involved".62 This may indicate
a slightly higher threshold for the grant of extraterritorial relief in a
section 25 situation. On the other hand this may simply be the application
of the same requirement in non-section 25 cases that extraterritorial
Mareva injunctions will be granted only in an exceptional case and indeed
the reasoning on this point in Duvalier was relied upon in Derby & Co. v.
Weldon (No.l).a Second, and perhaps more significant in the consider-
ation of the discretion under section 25(2), was the submission that the
proper court to grant interim relief is the court having jurisdiction over
the substance or the court(s) having jurisdiction where the assets are
located. Supported by the European Court's judgment in Denilauer,
Staughton LJ saw "considerable force" in this point and suggested that a
time limit for an injunction over assets abroad may be appropriate in
order to allow the plaintiff sufficient time to establish the whereabouts of
the assets.64 Again it is not clear that this suggestion would form part of
the exercise of discretion only under section 25(2). As Collins has noted,
the developments, principally in Babanaft and related cases, that Mareva
injunctions could be granted abroad were an extension of the original
principle that Mareva injunctions were designed to prevent the removal
of assets from the jurisdiction and hence thought restricted to assets
within the jurisdiction.65 This concern ties in with the view that the
60. [1989] 1 AM E.R. 456.
61. Idem, pp.466-461.
62. Idem, p.467.
63. [1990] 1 All E.R. 469,473. See also Rosseel, supra n.56. Neither of these cases was
brought under sJ5.
64. Duvalier, supra n.60, at p.466.
65. Collins, op. cit. supra n.l, at pp.87-88.
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purpose of Article 24 jurisdiction is to ensure subsequent court orders of
the court dealing with the substance are not less effective in the
jurisdiction of the court where the provisional, including protective,
measures are granted.66
There has been recent case law in the English courts on extraterritorial
Mareva injunctions under section 25. In 5 & T Bautrading v. Nordling61
the Court of Appeal considered that under section 25 of the 1982 Act a
court would not make an order which extended beyond its own territorial
jurisdiction save in an exceptional case. In that case a post-judgment
Mareva injunction was sought and Saville LJ considered that strong
evidence of fraud and concealment of assets did not make the case
exceptional. This followed earlier case law, notably Rosseel NV v.
Oriental Commercial Shipping (UK) Limited.68 However, this has
recently been doubted by the Court of Appeal decision in Cridit Suisse v.
Cuoghi.*** Importantly, it was stressed that Rosseel was not a section 25
case, despite the reference in the decision to Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier,
and merely referred to the wording of section 25(2) en passant. There are
conflicting messages from the judgments in this recent case. The Court of
Appeal dismissed an appeal against an earlier refusal to discharge a
worldwide Mareva injunction. The Mareva and associated orders were
granted in favour of the plaintiffs, under section 25 of the 1982 Act, in aid
of a claim in civil proceedings brought in Switzerland alleging the
defendant's complicity in the misappropriation of funds by one of its
employees. The Lord Chief Justice pointed out that under section 25 the
English court had to recognise that its role was to be supportive of and
subordinate to the primary court, i.e. the court with jurisdiction over the
substance of the matter. On the other hand, the leading judgment by
Millett LJ rejected the exceptional circumstances requirement derived
from Rosseel. This approach appears to make extraterritorial orders more
accessible under section 25. Whilst confirming that direct orders against
assets should be made by the courts of the States where they are located,
in personam orders would be granted subject to two main consider-
ations—the domicile of the defender and the likely reaction of the court
seised of the substance. Millett LJ considered that an in personam order
against a defendant resident in England was unlikely to be found
objectionable. The structure of subsections (1) and (2), together with the
fact that the scope of section 25 had been progressively widened,
indicated an intention for the English courts to be willing to aid foreign
courts where the substance of the action lay. It was noted that no
66. See DenUauer v. Couchet Frires [1980] E.C.R. 1553.
67. [1977] 3 All E.R. 718.
68. [1990] 3 All E.R. 545.
69. [1997] 3 All E.R. 724.
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reference was made in Bautrading to section 25(2) and that the
requirement for the existence of exceptional circumstances was a
regrettable gloss on the term "inexpedient". As Lenon notes, this
extension is likely to mean that Mareva injunctions are sought extraterri-
torially with greater frequency under section 25.70
There are several areas of concern about the application of Article 24
by the courts in England and Wales in relation to extraterritorial interim
relief. First, with the notable exception of Staughton LJ in Duvalier, is the
apparent misinterpretation of the European Court's view of the validity
of extraterritorial provisional, including protective, measures put forward
in Denilauer. Second, and possibly most important, is the lack of clarity in
distinguishing between different types of case and the applicable
principles in the exercise of the discretion to grant extraterritorial interim
relief in those different situations. Article 24 cases are being uncon-
sciously confused with non-Article 24 cases and, similarly, section 25
situations with non-section 25 situations. Although the principles in
determining whether interim relief should be granted may be the same,
this should be clarified and justified by the courts. For instance, Babanaft
was not a section 25 case but a case in which the English court also had
jurisdiction over the substance. Perhaps even more important, section 25
itself may be further subdivided into cases falling within Article 24 and
cases falling outside the scope of the Brussels Convention altogether. The
third difficulty is the fact that the European Court has not addressed,
except tangentially in Denilauer, the issue of recognition and enforce-
ment of Article 24 provisional measures. This may be partly due to the
dicta in Denilauer, stating that provisional measures are normally taken in
the place where they are most likely to be effective, i.e. where the assets
are. Nonetheless, Collins suggests71 that there is English authority, such as
in Babanaft, recently followed in Cridit Suisse, that worldwide Mareva
injunctions may be entitled to recognition if granted under the Conven-
tion and granted inter paries.
The recent case of Coin Controls Ltd v. Suzo International (UK) Ltd72
has also considered the application of Article 24. In that case, the court
declined jurisdiction in respect of foreign patents due to the combined
effect of Articles 16(4) and 19 of the Convention. This aspect of the
judgment is perfectly understandable. However, it would have been
expected in the context of proceedings for interlocutory relief that Article
24 would have been mentioned directly. The court noted that under the
kort geding procedure in Holland interlocutory injunctions effective
abroad have been granted in patent matters. Laddie J stated vaguely that
70. Lenon, op. cil supra n39, at p.1236.
71. Gollins, op. cit. supra n.l, at p.98.
72. [1997] 3 All E.R. 45.
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"such powers may arise out of art 24 of the Convention which is of very
wide scope and apparently is not limited by the provisions of art 16".73
Strangely, this led him to the conclusion that "it therefore has no direct
bearing on the issues I have to raise".74 If Article 24 is not limited by
Article 16 then one assumes that Article 24 jurisdiction may be available.
Laddie J, however, declined to consider the matter further, "in view of the
fact that I have decided in any event not to grant interlocutory relief",75
possibly in ignorance of the fact that the grant of interlocutory relief
depends upon a proper analysis of Article 24 and its implementing
provision in section 25. Accordingly, the issues related to extraterritorial
application of interim relief did not arise for consideration.
The connection between Article 24 and exclusive jurisdiction under the
Convention has also been considered, albeit indirectly, in the recent case
of Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd v. AKZO Nobel NV.16 This case took
place against the background of the recent practice by Dutch courts of
granting cross-border injunctions in respect of patent infringements. The
Dutch courts apparently did not agree with English authority77 which was
to the effect that where both the validity and infringement of a patent
were in issue then the former was the principal issue to be determined
under Article 16(4) in the court where the patent had been registered. Ex
parte infringement proceedings had been commenced in the Dutch courts
seeking interlocutory relief in respect of breaches of its Dutch patent in
Holland and UK patent in the United Kingdom. It was accepted that the
Dutch court would not grant final relief until the validity had been
determined in the United Kingdom but the Dutch court apparently
considered itself to have the power to grant interlocutory relief. The
petitioners sought an injunction to restrain the respondents from bringing
or maintaining legal proceedings in the Netherlands.78 The petitioners'
claim that this was a blatant attempt at forum-shopping was rejected by
Laddie J on the basis that a party could not be restrained from continuing
foreign proceedings because the foreign court could not be trusted to
apply the Convention properly or to act fairly.
The Court of Appeal rejected the appellants' appeal, expressed certain
views on the application of Articles 16(4) and 24, but ultimately made a
reference to the European Court. In relation to Article 16(4), the effect of
which was considered to be crucial to the provisional measures issue, the
court considered that Article differentiated between patent infringement
73. Idem, p.62.
74. Ibid
75. Ibid
76. [1998] F.S.R. 222.
77. E.g. Coin Controls, supra n.72.
78. Sec Socitli Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak and Another [1987] 1
A.C. 871.
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and validity proceedings, although the distinction could not always be
made, dependent upon the parties' pleadings. In the present case the
defences raised the question of validity and therefore the claim fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the UK courts. In relation to Article 24 the
court's analysis is somewhat strange. First, the court considered that
provisional, including protective, measures had to be in aid of, or as an
adjunct to, some final determination then in contemplation. The court
noted that although provisional relief would not be available in the
United Kingdom, due to the delay by the respondents in taking any
action, it was for the Dutch courts to determine if provisional relief was
available. Nonetheless, the court appears (the judgment is rather
awkward here) to consider that, if the UK courts have exclusive
jurisdiction, there is no justification for the respondents seeking interim
relief before the Dutch courts, and that it was vexatious to seek such
relief. Although not articulated at this point, this was presumably
because, as the judgment had earlier noted, the respondents had not
initiated any proceedings in the United Kingdom and had no intention of
doing so, a requirement not apparent in the terms of Article 24 or prior
jurisprudence of the European Court. The court considered that, as the
views adopted in relation to Articles 16(4) and 24 were not acte claire, an
injunction would not be granted and a reference would be made to the
European Court—which will hopefully clarify further the requirements
for Article 24 jurisdiction, particularly in relation to the provisions on
exclusive jurisdiction.
B. Scotland
1. Mode of implementation of Article 24
The specific provisions on provisional and protective measures for
Scots law are to be found in sections 27 and 28 of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982. Guidance on these provisions can be obtained from
a report of an advisory body which examined the effect of implemen-
tation of the Brussels Convention on Scots law.79 The Maxwell Com-
mittee noted that Article 24 could be read narrowly as simply declaring
that courts in a contracting State continued to have jurisdiction over
provisional or protective measures under their existing law, despite the
rules on jurisdiction in the Brussels Convention itself. Alternatively,
Article 24 could be read as requiring a contracting State to make available
provisional and protective measures for the benefit of litigants under the
79. Report of the Scottish Committee on Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Chairman
Lord Maxwell; HMSO, Edinburgh, 1980). A similar body examined the impact of the
Convention on English law but its report was never made public.
330 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VOL. 48
Convention in all other contracting States, even if such measures were not
available under the existing law of that contracting State. The Committee
noted that this point was of some significance because in Scots law at that
time certain provisional remedies could be obtained only in respect of
actions in the Scottish courts. While noting that ultimately the interpret-
ation of Article 24 was a matter for the European Court, the Committee
inclined towards the narrower reading of Article 24 as the correct one but
nonetheless concluded that the spirit of the Convention required
providing litigants throughout the Convention countries with the same
provisional remedies as awarded to litigants in Scotland.80
2. Provisional and protective measures in Scotland under Article 24
Sections 27 and 28 of the 1982 Act allow the Court of Session to grant
types of provisional and protective remedies in the absence of substantive
proceedings in Scotland. It may be noted that unlike the position in
England the Scottish provisions specify and presumably therefore limit
the provisional and protective measures which are used to give effect to
Article 24.
The measures provided by section 27 are arrestment, inhibition and
interim interdict. Arrestment is a measure which prevents a third party
who is holding money or other types of moveable property of a defender
from handing over the property to him. By itself it does not give the
pursuer any right directly to the arrested property (this requires further
procedures based on success in the litigation) but does confer preferences
over other claimants against the defender. There are circumstances in
which an arrestment has extraterritorial effect, e.g. an arrestment served
on a bank in Scotland can attach funds held in a branch of the bank in
England or elsewhere, but the scope of this extraterritorial effect is not
clear.81 However, an order granted under section 27 is restricted in its
operation to assets situated in Scotland.82
Inhibition is a form of prohibition against the defender alienating his
heritable property.83 The measure works by way of a personal prohibition
on the defender, though its chief effect is achieved by recording the
inhibition in one of the public registers. Again, while inhibition, as with
arrestment, does not give the pursuer any direct right to the defender's
property, it does confer preferences in any competition with other
80. Idem, paras.5.234-5.236.
81. G. Maher and D. J. Cusine, The Law and Practice of Diligence (1990), pp.116-117;
Scottish Law Commission Report: Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty Arrest-
ments (Scot. Law Com. No.164 (1998)), pp.196-197.
82 1982 Act, s.27(l)(a).
83. In internal Scots law the distinction between forms of property is between moveable
and heritable property, which broadly corresponds to but is not identical to the conflicts
distinction between moveable and immoveable property.
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claimants. Inhibition is a remedy which can operate only against heritable
property situated in Scotland and this is confirmed by the terms of section
27 itself.84
The final remedy referred to in section 27 is interim interdict. Interdict
is a remedy with broad similarities to remedies in other legal systems,
including the injunction known to English law. Interdict can have
extraterritorial effect in the sense that a party subject to the jurisdiction of
the Scottish courts may be interdicted from carrying out acts outside
Scotland. However, unlike the Mareva injunction, an interdict has effect
only against the party named in it and not against any third party who has
knowledge of its terms.
The preconditions for granting these measures under section 27 are
that, as regards arrestment and inhibition, the principal proceedings have
been commenced but not concluded in another legal system, including
one elsewhere in the United Kingdom. As regards interim interdict, an
alternative situation is that the substantive proceedings are yet to be
commenced.83 It may also be noted that as far as arrestment and inhibition
are concerned it must have been competent to have granted these
measures in equivalent proceedings in a Scottish action but that no similar
limitation exists as regards interim interdict.
Some comment may be made on the way in which section 27 seeks to
give effect to Article 24 for these Scottish provisional and protective
measures. The reason the Scottish courts may grant interim interdict
under the section in circumstances where they could not do so in
equivalent Scottish proceedings is somewhat prosaic. The Maxwell
Committee noted that in Scottish practice it was not possible to seek an
interim interdict without also seeking a perpetual or permanent interdict.
The Committee recognised that this requirement would be inappropriate
in a situation where no substantive proceedings were to be raised in
Scotland, and recommended that it should be possible for Article 24
purposes in Scotland to seek interim interdict only. It was presumably to
give effect to this recommendation that section 27 of the 1982 Act makes
84. 1982 Act, s.27(l)(b). A crucial and remarkable feature of the provisional remedies
of arrestment and inhibition is that they are granted to pursuers who raise an action seeking
payment of money as now due, as of right and without any judicial scrutiny or supervision.
For critical consideration of the present Scots law see G. Maher, "Diligence on the
Dependence: Principles for Reform" (1996) Juridical Rev. 188. The Scottish Law
Commission has recently recommended changes to this part of the law (see op. cil supra
n.81).
85. As originally enacted s.27 remedies could be granted only where the principal action
had been or, in the case of interim interdict, was about to be raised in another contracting
State or elsewhere in the UK and the subject of the action fell within the scope of the
Convention. However, these limitations were removed by S.I. 1997/2780. For discussion of
some of the problems arising from these changes, see G. Maher, "Provisional and Protective
Measures in Respect of Foreign Proceedings" 1998 S.L.T. (News) 225.
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the provisions noted above but, as will be seen, the courts have given a
wider reading to this rule that the grant of interim interdict under the
section need not have been competent in equivalent Scottish proceedings.
A further issue arises from the preconditions for the application of
section 27. A warrant for arrestment or inhibition may be granted under
section 27 only if the substantive proceedings have been commenced but
not yet concluded. It is not obvious why the Court of Session's power
should be so restricted. Article 24 itself has no requirement that a
substantive action has been commenced but, rather, that a court in
another contracting State has jurisdiction as to substance. The position is
different as to interim interdict: here the Court has power to grant the
measure even if the substantive proceedings are still to be commenced.
Indeed on a literal reading of section 27 this is the only time during which
this provisional remedy can be granted under section 27. However, the
courts and commentators read the statute as empowering the Court to
grant interim interdict not only before the main action has been started
but also once it has been commenced but not concluded. What is clear,
however, is that none of these provisional remedies can be granted in
Scotland once the main action is concluded. There is no obvious reason
why this restriction applies to Scots law. It is not required by Article 24
and no similar restriction exists in English law.
A further provision of the 1982 Act which gives effect to Article 24 in
Scots law is section 28. This provides for the Court of Session to use its
powers under section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act
1972 (as amended) in respect of actions which either have been or are
likely to be brought elsewhere.86 Section 1 of the 1972 Act is an important
provision in relation to evidence. It confers on the court a wide range of
powers in connection not only with the preservation of evidence and
property in dispute but also with the recovery (the Scottish term for
discovery) of such evidence and property. The Maxwell Committee
recognised that while some of the section 1 powers were clearly
provisional or protective in nature, and thus within the scope of Article
24, other provisions (especially those relating to recovery) were not.87
Nonetheless, the Committee took the view that it would be difficult to
split the power on this basis for purposes of giving effect to Article 24.
Instead it suggested that any difficulty which would arise here might be
resolved by leaving matters to the discretion of the Court. This approach
was followed in the 1982 Act, which states that the Court can use its
extended power under section 1 of the 1972 Act as if the foreign
86. In its original form s.28 extended only to actions within the scope of the Convention
brought in another contracting State or elsewhere in the UK. These restrictions were
removed by S.I. 1997/2780.
87. Maxwell Report, supra n.79, at paras.5.248-5.252.
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proceedings had been or were likely to be brought before it. In internal
Scots law the power of the Court to make an order under section 1 is
discretionary though there is a considerable body of case law which
guides the Court on the exercise of this discretion. A key question of
course is whether this guidance applies also to the Court's extended
power under section 28 of the 1982 Act.
The Maxwell Committee also gave some consideration to the general
nature of provisional, including protective, measures which fell within the
scope of Article 24 and which would be covered by the legislation to give
effect to that Article in Scots law. It noted that, in addition to arrestment,
inhibition, interim interdict, and orders for the preservation of evidence,
Scots law possessed other remedies which were of a provisional or
protective nature. Examples were interim appointments of a judicial
factor or a curator bonis but the Committee took the view that these
remedies normally involved topics such as bankruptcy or the status of
natural persons and as such were outside the scope of the Convention.
The Committee also concluded that other types of interim remedy, such
as interim awards of damages, were in effect orders for execution and not
protective measures and that recovery of documents and examination of
witnesses were also not provisional or protective measures for the
purposes of Article 24.
One further measure in Scots law which the Committee considered was
an order by which the Court of Session may require a litigant to undo an
illegal act already done by him.88 The committee took the view that it was
doubtful if such a measure, which can be seen as a positive version of
interdict, could be classified as provisional, including protective, in nature
mainly because it involves a decision on the substance of the action.
However, since the time of the Maxwell Report, it has become clear that
these orders may be made on an interim basis.89
Furthermore, section 47(2) of the Court of Session Act 1988 allows the
Court, while the action is still before it, to make an order regarding the
interim possession of any property to which the action relates.90 These
types of order share the essentially provisional nature of orders covered
by Article 24, and there seems no good reason to exclude them from the
provisions of sections 27 and 28 of the 1982 Act. One difficulty which
arises from the Scottish approach of defining the protective measures in
the statute itself is that the European Court may in future itself give firmer
88. Court of Session Act 1988, s.46 deriving from Court of Session Act 1868, s.89.
89. See Maersk & Co. Ltd v. National Union of Seamen 1988 S.L.T. 828; Stirling
Shipping Co. Ltd v. National Union of Seamen 1988 S.L.T. 832; Five Oaks Properties Ltd v.
Granite House Ltd 1994 S.C.L.R. 740.
90. See e.g. Church Commissioners for England v. Abbey National pic 1994 S.L.T. 959;
Retail Park Investments Ltd v. Royal Bank of Scotland pic 1995 S.L.T. 1156; Millar & Bryce
Ltd v. Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1997 S.L.T. 1000.
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guidance on what for Article 24 purposes is a provisional, including
protective, measure. Scots law might then find itself in a position that
some of its provisional remedies fall within the scope of Article 24 but are
not included in the provisions of the 1982 Act which seek to give effect to
that Article of the Convention.
3. Judicial approaches to protective measures in the absence of
substantive proceedings
Since the 1982 Act came into force in 1987 there have been a number of
reported decisions on the use of sections 27 and 28. These cases do throw
some light on how the Scottish courts approach their powers under these
provisions though it cannot yet be said that the Scottish courts have
developed consistent principles of interpretation on all aspects of this part
of the law.
Two cases have involved the grant of warrant for arrestment and
inhibition under section 27. In Stancroft Securities v. McDowalf1 the
Inner House of the Court of Session held that the Lord Ordinary had
taken the wrong approach to section 27 when he had refused to grant
warrants for arrestment and inhibition in respect of an action proceeding
in England. The Lord Ordinary held that as there were no exact
equivalents to these measures known to English law it would not be
appropriate to grant them in the circumstances of the present case where
application under section 27 had been made ex parte and where the
petitioner could have initiated proceedings in Scotland to obtain these
provisional remedies. The Inner House held that none of these reasons
was correct. The whole purpose of section 27 was to prevent actions on
substantive issues being raised in every legal system where provisional
remedies were sought. The Inner House also pointed out that the present
concern was with the provisional remedies of Scots law, and it did not
matter whether those remedies had equivalents in the legal system of the
substantive action.
This decision is important since it was made by the Inner House and
thus has authority as a precedent. At first glance it appears to suggest that
the Scottish courts should approach applications under section 27 in
exactly the same way as if warrant for arrestment or inhibition were being
sought in a Scottish action. The difficulty with this interpretation is that
the Inner House also mentioned that the Lord Ordinary had a discretion
as to whether or not to make an order under section 27. In Scottish cases,
however, pursuers can seek the provisional remedies of arrestment and
inhibition as of right and, far from having a discretion whether to grant
them, j udges are not involved in decisions on granting these remedies. It is
true that there may be an exception to this general rule of Scottish
91. 1990 S.L.T. 746.
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practice where application is made during the action, by way of motion,
rather than at its start. It is not entirely clear if this exception is soundly
established but, even if it is, there still arises the question whether an
application under section 27 is more analogous to an application in a
Scottish action at the start or during that action. In Stancroft itself the
Inner House92 rejected the Lord Ordinary's views about not granting
remedies on an exparte application by noting that this was frequently how
warrants for arrestment and inhibition were obtained in Scottish practice.
Accordingly, it seems that a section 27 petition is to be treated more as an
initial application for arrestment or inhibition than as one made during an
action.
The confusion as to whether Scottish courts have a discretion to grant
arrestment or inhibition under section 27 which they undoubtedly lack in
Scottish actions is added to by the decision of Clipper Shipping Co. v. San
Vincent Partners.93 In this case the substantive action was proceeding in
Denmark. The applicant sought and obtained authority under section 27
to arrest a ship in Scotland belonging to the defenders in the main action.
Warrant was granted on an ex parte application and the shipowners
sought recall of the arrestment. The Lord Ordinary dealing with the recall
noted that in Scots law there existed limitations on the arrestment of a
ship on the dependence of an action by virtue of section 47 of the
Administration of Justice Act 1956, which gives effect in Scots law to the
1952 Brussels Convention on the Arrestment of Seagoing Ships. How-
ever, on this point the Lord Ordinary held that while it may have been
originally assumed that the 1956 Act applied only to actions raised in
Scotland, section 27 has the effect of widening the scope of the court's
power to allow arrestment of a ship to actions raised elsewhere. Of more
concern to the present issue is the other matter dealt with in this case. The
Lord Ordinary also held that the warrant for arrestment had properly
been granted because there was a sufficient basis for asserting that the
applicants had a colourable case in the main action. The basis for this was
evidence that, by Danish law (which was the applicable law of the
substantive dispute), the plaintiff in that action had an intelligible and
discernible cause of action. It is important to see this part of the decision
in its proper context. Generally speaking in internal law warrant for
arrestment and inhibition do not require that the pursuer is likely to be
successful in the action or even that he has any case in law. However,
there may be an exception to this general rule where the arrested subject
is a ship, though this point is far from certain.94 In any case even if there is
92. Idem, p.748J.
93. 1989 S.L.T. 204.
94. The requirement that a pursuer has a "colourable" case to justify the use of
arrestment in the dependence of an action was first stated in West Cumberland Farmers Ltd
v. Ellon Hinengo Ltd 1988 S.L.T. 294, a decision relied on and followed in Clipper Shipping,
ibid. However, in West Cumberland Farmers no reference was made to authorities for the
general principle in Scots law that there is no requirement as to the substance of a case
before warrant for arrestment or inhibition may be granted.
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such a test it is one which exists both as respects Scottish actions and
applications under section 27 of the 1982 Act.
There have been three cases involving the grant of interim interdict
under section 27. The first two concerned the grant of this remedy in terms
which would not have been competent in a Scottish action governed by
Scots law. Somewhat surprisingly, in neither case was there any direct
discussion of the provision in section 27 that there is no necessity for
granting interim interdict under the section that it would have been
competent to do so in equivalent Scottish proceedings. In Lord Advocate
v. Campbell5 an injunction had been granted that same day in England to
prevent the publication of information relating to the UK intelligence
services. The form of the injunction extended this prohibition not only to
the respondent who was expressly named in it but also to any other person
having notice of it. It was at the very least doubtful that an interdict could
be granted under Scots law in these wide terms. Nonetheless, the Lord
Ordinary granted interim interdict in these terms but indicated that he did
so as the balance of convenience favoured granting the remedy purely as a
temporary and protective matter.
G v. Caledonian Newspapers Ltd96 involved a similar situation: here an
injunction had been obtained in English proceedings in a form which
would not have been available under Scots law. The Lord Ordinary
granted interim interdict in terms similar to those of the English
injunction but his reasons for doing so are not entirely clear. He did not
refer to section 27 as allowing him to do so in express terms. Instead his
Lordship appeared to be saying that the issue was one of the correct
applicable law to the dispute. He found nothing in the terms of Article 24
to prevent him holding that he should apply the same substantive law in
the ancillary proceedings before him as that applicable in the principal
proceedings in England.
It is not easy to reconcile these decisions with the general principle that
Article 24 remedies are governed by the law of the courts which grant
them. The two judgments make no express reference to the way in which
section 27 itself departs from this principle in respect of interim interdict
but in neither case was the judge referred to the apparent, technical
reason for this feature of the 1982 Act in the recommendation of the
Maxwell Report. Furthermore, though the judges granted interim
interdict in a form not known to Scots law, they appeared to have had in
mind the substantive preconditions for the remedy according to Scots law.
This is indicated by the reference to the balance of convenience in the
Campbell decision, and even more so in the Caledonian Newspapers case,
where the Lord Ordinary mentioned the test in Scots law that a prima
95. Outer House 17 Mar. 1988, noted in 1988 G.W.D. 9-370.
96. 1995 S.L.T. 559.
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facie case for the remedy had to be made out. In the circumstances of that
case he found that this test was to be met in accordance with English law
and held that the order of the English court itself was sufficient indication
that the Scottish criterion of a prima facie case had been made out
according to English law in English proceedings.
Another decision involved the grant of interim interdict in relation to a
potential action in Northern Ireland but the Court of Session failed to
articulate that it was using its section 27 power. In WA C Ltd v. Whilloclc"
a contract contained a clause providing that all disputes in relation to it
were to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Northern
Ireland. One of the parties sought an interim interdict from the Court of
Session to prevent breach by the other party of a restrictive covenant in
the contract. This situation appeared to provide the Court with an ideal
opportunity to consider the interrelationship between section 27 (and
hence Article 24) and provisions on exclusive jurisdiction. In the event the
defenders conceded that the Court of Session had jurisdiction but the
basis of this concession is not clear. It was noted earlier that it can be
argued that Article 24 is compatible with provisions which confer
exclusive jurisdiction on courts of other legal systems, including those
concerning prorogation by the parties, but it is simply not possible to
discern any such basis for the Court assuming jurisdiction in this case.98
To date there have been two reported decisions on the use of section 28
of the 1982 Act. In Iomega Corporation v. Myrica (UK) Ltd" the Court
held that where documents or other evidence had already been recovered
under section 1 of the 1972 Act in respect of an ongoing or prospective
Scottish action then the Court had a discretion to allow the evidence to be
used in other litigation outside Scotland. It was expressly noted that this
result would also apply where the evidence had been recovered under
section 28 of the 1982 Act. Beyond that comment little insight can be
gained about the approach taken to section 28. Of more interest is the
decision in Union Carbide Corpn v. BP Chemicals Ltd,100 where the
petitioners had raised an action in England against the respondents in
respect of breach of patent rights. Under the rules of procedure of the
English courts, the plaintiffs in the English action were required to specify
various details of their claim. In order to satisfy this requirement the
plaintiffs petitioned the Court of Session seeking recovery of documents
and other property in the hands of the defendants in Scotland. The Lord
97. 1990 S.L.T. 213.
98. Indeed the Court appears to have based its jurisdiction on jurisdiction rules which
treated the application for interdict as an independent, substantive action: see idem,
pp.215C, 219D. It does not appear from the report that the action was raised by way of a s.27
petition.
99. 1998 S.C.L.R. 475.
100. 1995 S.L.T. 972.
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Ordinary granted the appropriate order. In refusing a reclaiming motion
against this decision, the Inner House made a number of comments on the
use to be made by the Scottish courts of their powers under section 28.
Lord President Hope noted that section 28 gave effect to Article 24 of the
Brussels Convention but in respect of orders for production and recovery
of documents it extended beyond measures which were purely pro-
visional or protective in nature. Moreover, the court made it clear that, in
using its discretion whether to make an order under section 28, a Scottish
court should not treat the issue entirely as if it were deciding a purely
Scottish case. Instead the Scottish court had to take some account of the
other (non-Scottish) proceedings. Where, as in the present case, a
Scottish order was required in order to allow a litigant to comply with the
procedural rules of another legal system, for the Scottish court to be
satisfied that the order was justified it would have to consider the rules
and practices of that other system. Lord Hope in this context drew a
distinction between cases where the party in Scotland who held the
documents or property now being sought under section 28 was or was not
the other party in the main litigation elsewhere.
Where that person was not a party to the other proceedings (or where
those other proceedings had not yet been brought) there was a stronger
basis for the Scottish courts to use its section 28 power than where the
person was directly involved in the foreign proceedings. This is because
the court of the main proceedings is less likely to have effective control
over someone in Scotland not subject to its jurisdiction. However, where
the person is a party to the main proceedings, the Scottish court should be
careful about granting a section 28 order. In this situation the Scottish
court, which is not familiar with the law and practices of the other court,
might find itself granting a discretionary remedy which the other court
would not itself grant. A further point made in Union Carbide was that,
whereas in that case the purpose of a section 28 order was to enable a
party to comply with procedural requirements of the main action, the
Scottish court had to consider the rules and practices of that court and not
those of the Scottish courts in deciding whether to exercise its discretion
to grant the order.
V. CONCLUSION
PROVISIONAL, including protective, measures remain a problematic part
of the Brussels Convention. To date many of the issues and difficulties
identified by commentators have not received a clear or definitive answer
from the European Court. Furthermore, the situation in respect of the
approach to Article 24 within the legal systems in Great Britain reflects
this uncertainty. There is a diversity of approach between English and
Scots law not just in terms of judicial response but even in respect of
legislative implementation. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
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1982 gives effect to Article 24 in English law by leaving open the range of
measures which may fall within its scope (with only two types of measure
being expressly excluded from its ambit). Additionally, English law
allows for Article 24 remedies to be granted in a wide range of
circumstances, whilst Scots law limits the appropriate provisional and
protective remedies to four specific types and allows for the grant of these
measures in a much narrower set of circumstances than those under
English law. As regards judicial response to the legislative measures, it
must be said that in neither system have the courts made clear
pronouncements of the relevant underlying principles but it is obvious
that the courts in the two systems are adopting differing approaches. The
English courts on the whole take the view that all section 25 cases are
dealt with on much the same basis as remedies granted where the main
proceedings are themselves English. By contrast, the Scottish courts do
not treat the grant of protective and provisional orders under the Act in
the same way as they deal with the same measures in Scottish actions. No
doubt provisional and protective remedies reflect aspects of particular
legal cultures and backgrounds, and the experience of dealing with
Article 24 in the English and Scottish legal systems illustrates this point.
Nevertheless, if a moral is to be drawn then it may be that for an effective
system of provisional remedies there is need for a common European
protective remedy, an option currently under consideration as part of the
reform of the Brussels Convention.
